We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled -specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in the lottery CSF model, attackers use the "guerrilla-warfare" strategy and attack only one target instead of the equilibrium "complete-coverage" strategy that attacks all targets. Consistent with equilibrium in both models, as the attacker's valuation increases, the average resource expenditure, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender).
Introduction
In many network applications, such as cyber-security, electrical power grids, or oil pipeline systems, the failure of any individual component in the network may be sufficient to disable the entire network. In the case of a system of dikes on the perimeter of an island, Hirshleifer (1983) coined the term weakest-link to describe this type of intra-network complementarity among components.
1 In addition to networks with physically linked components, political considerations may, also, create a situation in which physically disjoint components are connected by a form of weakest-link complementarity in preferences. For example, a single terrorist spectacular may allow a terrorist to influence its target audience. 2 This paper experimentally examines two models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets that differ with respect to the choice of contest success function (CSF), i.e. the mapping from the two players' resource allocations to a target into their probabilities of winning the target, used to model the conflict at each target.
In the attack and defense of a weakest-link network, the nature of the CSF is a key determinant of equilibrium behavior. We focus on two CSFs, lottery and auction, which are two special cases of the general ratio-form contest success function " # /( " # + ' # ) where " and '
are the attacker's and defender's allocations of force, respectively, and the parameter > 0 is inversely related to the level of noise, or randomness, in the determination of the winner of the conflict (conditional on the players' allocations). In the lottery CSF = 1, a situation in which the outcome of the conflict at each target has a relatively high amount of noise. The auction CSF 1 Applications of the weakest-link structure include: organizational performance that depends on the weakest-link (Kremer, 1993) ; internet security (Moore et al., 2009 ); and package auctions in which the objective of some bidders is to obtain all of the goods while for other bidders the objective is to obtain only one good (Milgrom, 2007) . 2 As stated in the Joint House-Senate Intelligence Inquiry into September 11, 2001 (US Congress, 2002 , terrorists need to be successful only once to kill Americans and demonstrate the inherent vulnerabilities they face.
corresponds to the limiting case where = ∞, a situation in which there is no noise (i.e., the player that allocates the higher level of force wins).
3
In Clark and Konrad (2007) the conflict at each target of the weakest-link attackerdefender game features the lottery CSF. They assume that the exogenous noise generated is independent across targets and demonstrate the existence of a pure-strategy "complete-coverage" equilibrium in which all targets are attacked and defended. 4 In contrast, Kovenock and Roberson (2017) show that, in all equilibria of the game with the auction CSF, the attacker utilizes a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" mixed strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target -where each target is equally likely to be the one that is attacked -with a random level of force. 5 Conversely, the defender uses a mixed strategy that stochastically covers all of the targets, allocating a random level of force to each target. This results in a correlation structure of endogenous noise that makes all multiple target attacks payoff dominated by a single target attack. 6 In this paper, we complete the characterization of equilibrium in the lottery CSF version of the game by showing that equilibrium is unique and test the implications of these two models in a laboratory experiment. We employ a two-by-two design that investigates the impact of the CSF (lottery versus auction) and the relative valuation of the attacker's prize (low versus high) on the behavior of attackers and defenders.
The results of our experiment support the theoretical prediction that, under the auction CSF, attackers use a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy of attacking at most one target, and 3 However, as noted in the case of a single two-player contest with linear costs − by Baye et al. (1994) and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) − there exist equilibria that are payoff equivalent to the = ∞ case whenever > 2. Ewerhart (2017a) has demonstrated that, in fact, in this environment any Nash equilibrium is payoff and revenue equivalent to the all-pay auction. Thus, the auction CSF case with r = ∞ is a relevant theoretical benchmark for all > 2. 4 For the attacker, this prediction holds for all parameter configurations. For the defender, this prediction holds if the ratio of the attacker's valuation of success to the defender's valuation of success is below a certain threshold. 5 See also the related papers Dziubiński and Goyal (2013, 2017) . 6 For almost all configurations of the players' valuations of winning, one of the two players drops out with positive probability by allocating zero resources to each target, with the identity of the dropout determined by a measure of asymmetry in the conflict that takes into account both the ratio of the players' valuations and the number of targets.
defenders use a stochastic "complete-coverage" strategy in which all targets are defended. In contrast, under the lottery CSF, instead of the pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium "completecoverage" strategy, the expenditures of both the attackers and defenders are distributed over the entire strategy space. In fact, under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy of attacking at most one target almost 45% of the time, instead of using a "completecoverage" strategy, which is observed less than 30% of the time.
Consistent with predictions, under both CSFs, as the attacker's valuation increases, the attacker's resource expenditure increases and the defender's expenditure decreases. As a result, the attacker's probability of winning and the average payoff also increase. However, under both CSFs, both players' average resource expenditures exceed their respective theoretical predictions, as is common in other contest experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2015) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review of the multi-battle contest literature. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of the attack and defense game. Section 4 describes the experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. Section 5 reports the results of our experiment and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Most of the existing theoretical work on multi-battle contests features symmetric objectives. 7 However, in applications such as cyber-security and terrorism, objectives are asymmetric with success for the attacker requiring the destruction of at least one target and 7 For a survey see Kovenock and Roberson (2012) . Recent theoretical work on multi-battle/Blotto-type games includes extensions such as: asymmetric players (Roberson, 2006; Hart, 2008; Weinstein, 2012; Dziubiński, 2013; Macdonell and Mastronardi, 2015) , non-constant-sum variations (Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003; Kvasov, 2007; Llorente-Saguer, 2010, 2012; Roberson and Kvasov, 2012; Ewerhart, 2017b) , alternative definitions of success (Golman and Page, 2009; Tang et al., 2010; Rinott et al., 2012) , and political economy applications (Laslier, 2002; Laslier and Picard, 2002; Roberson, 2008; Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2016; Boyer et al. 2017; Thomas, 2017) . There is also an extensive theoretical literature on dynamic multi-battle contests. See, for instance, Harris and Vickers (1987) , Klumpp and Polborn (2006) , Kovenock (2009), and Gelder (2014) .
successful defense requiring the preservation of all targets (Sandler and Enders, 2004) . This structural asymmetry is the focus of the two weakest-link attacker-defender games (Clark and Konrad, 2007; Kovenock and Roberson, 2017 ) that we test experimentally.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine behavior in weakest-link attacker-defender games utilizing both the lottery CSF and the auction CSF. Although most of the existing experimental studies focus on single-battle contests, there is a growing interest in multi-battle contests. 8 Experimental studies on multi-battle contests have examined how different factors such as budget constraints (Avrahami and Kareev, 2009; Arad and Rubinstein, 2012) , objective functions (Duffy and Matros, 2017) , information (Horta-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2010), contest success functions (Chowdhury et al., 2013) , focality (Chowdhury et al., 2016) , and asymmetries in resources and battlefields (Arad, 2012; Holt et al., 2015; Montero et al., 2016, Duffy and Matros, 2017) impact individual behavior in contests. For a recent survey of the experimental literature on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2015) .
Consistent with the previous studies in which allocations are not budget constrained, we find significant over-expenditure relative to the Nash equilibrium predictions under both the lottery CSF and the auction CSF. However, our most surprising result is that the theoretical prediction that attackers use a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy under the auction CSF is also observed under the lottery CSF. This is surprising because almost all multi-battle contest experiments in the literature find strong qualitative support for the theoretical predictions, even if the precise quantitative predictions are refuted. A potential explanation as to why attackers use a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy under the lottery CSF is that subjects may find it natural to concentrate resources on just one target since one successful attack is enough to win. Such a 8 There is also a growing experimental literature on dynamic multi-battle contests. See, for instance, Sheremeta (2012, 2015) , Mago et al. (2013) , Sheremeta (2016, 2017) , and Gelder and Kovenock (2017) . Clark and Konrad (2007) derive a Nash equilibrium for the lottery CSF ( = 1). We complete the characterization of equilibrium by showing that equilibrium is unique (see Online Appendix A).
Proposition 1:
(i) If ' ≥ ( − 1) " , then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is in pure strategies. In equilibrium, player allocates " * = P < Q P 9 R P < =P 9 RST to every target and player allocates ' * = P < P 9 RST P < =P 9
RST to every target.
(ii) If ' < ( − 1) " , then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. In equilibrium, player allocates " * = ' to every target with probability * = P 9
(KVM)P < and 0 to every target with the probability 1 − * .
Proposition 1 can be summarized as follows. If the ratio of the defender's valuation to the attacker's valuation exceeds a threshold, ' ≥ ( − 1) " , then, in equilibrium, the defender uses a pure strategy that defends all targets with the same level of resources, ' * > 0. However, if ' < ( − 1) " , then the defender's equilibrium expected payoff is zero and, in equilibrium, the defender engages in the conflict -by allocating ' * > 0 to each target -with probability * = P 9
(KVM)P <
. With probability 1 − * , the defender "surrenders" by allocating 0 to all targets. In contrast, for all parameter configurations the attacker plays a pure strategy. Although the attacker's objective is to win at least one target, due to the decreasing returns to expenditure exhibited by the lottery CSF, the equilibrium strategy is to attack all targets with " * . Kovenock and Roberson (2017) (ii) If ' < " , player randomly attacks a single target with a resource allocation drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval 0, , respectively, over the interval 0,
It is important to note that, although there are multiple equilibria in this game, there exists a unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions. Kovenock and Roberson (2017) also show that the equilibrium joint distribution functions exhibit several distinctive properties. For example, in all equilibria of the auction CSF game, the attacker allocates a strictly positive amount to at most one target while the defender allocates a strictly positive amount to either all targets or to none of them. This particular property provides a striking contrast with equilibrium in the lottery CSF game (see Proposition 1) in which the attacker allocates, to every target, a strictly positive amount. In the Lottery-Low and Lottery-High treatments the probability that a player wins a given target is equal to the ratio of that player's allocation of resources to the target to the sum of both players' allocations to that target. In all treatments, the defender's valuation of defending all targets is ' = 200 experimental francs. The attacker's valuation of successfully attacking at least one target is " = 40 francs in the Lottery-Low treatment and " = 80 francs in the LotteryHigh treatment. 11 For the parameter configuration in the Lottery-Low treatment, Proposition 1 part (i) applies and in the pure-strategy equilibrium the attacker allocates 3.2 tokens to each 10 For example, players were called participants and targets were called boxes. 11 We chose these parameter valuations to ensure that: (a) the four treatments cover both parts of both propositions, and (b) each subject faced a non-trivial allocation problem in which both the attacker and the defender had a substantial chance of winning some targets.
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target and the defender allocates 16.1 tokens to each target. For the parameter configuration in the Lottery-High treatment, Proposition 1 part (ii) applies and in equilibrium the attacker allocates 5.3 tokens to each target and the defender allocates 15.8 tokens to every target with probability 0.83 and 0 tokens to every target with probability 0.17.
In the Auction-Low and Auction-High treatments the winner of each target is determined by the auction CSF, but the remaining features of the model ( ' , " , and ) are the same. From Proposition 2 part (i), in any equilibrium of the Auction-Low treatment: (a) the attacker utilizes a mixed-strategy that attacks no targets with probability 0.2 and, with probability 0.8, chooses
exactly one target to attack at random and stochastically allocates between 0 and 40 tokens to that target, according to a uniform distribution, and (b) the defender randomizes according to a joint distribution function that stochastically allocates between 0 and 40 tokens to each target according to a uniform marginal distribution. In the Auction-High treatment, Proposition 2 part
(ii) applies. In any equilibrium: (a) the attacker randomly chooses one of the targets to attack and stochastically allocates between 0 and 50 tokens to that target according to a uniform distribution and (b) the defender employs a mixed strategy in which, with probability 0.375 he engages in no defensive efforts and, with probability 0.625, the defender allocates a stochastic number of tokens, uniformly distributed between 0 and 50, to each target.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory. The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
A total of 96 subjects participated in eight sessions, summarized in Table 2 . All subjects were
Purdue University undergraduate students who participated in only one session of this study.
Some students had participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research.
Each experimental session had 12 subjects and proceeded in two parts, corresponding to the lottery and auction treatments. 12 Each subject played for 20 periods in the Lottery-Low In the first period of each treatment subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned for the first 10 periods and then changed their assignment for the last 10 periods. 13 Subjects of opposite assignments were randomly re-paired each period to form a new two-player group.
Each period, each subject allocated a non-negative number of tokens to each of the 4 targets such that the sum of allocated tokens was weakly less than that subject's valuation. Subjects were informed that all allocated tokens were forfeited. After all subjects made their allocations, the computer displayed the following information: attacker allocation, defender allocation, which targets they won, and individual earnings for the period. In the Lottery-High and Lottery-Low treatments, the winner was chosen according to the lottery CSF, independently across targets. In 12 Risk aversion preferences were also elicited, along the lines of Holt and Laury (2002) . We found no interesting patterns between risk attitudes and behavior in weakest-link contests and omit discussion of this issue. 13 Role switching avoids any social preferences, i.e., subjects who were assigned as disadvantaged attackers knew that they would also play the role of the advantaged defenders, and induces better learning, since subjects have an opportunity to learn strategies in the game in both roles.
the Auction-High and Auction-Low treatments, the player who allocated more tokens to a particular target was chosen as the winner of that target.
14 After completing all 40 decision periods (two treatments), 4 periods were randomly selected for payment (2 periods for each treatment). The sum of the total earnings for these 4
periods was exchanged at the rate of 26 tokens = $1. Additionally, all players received a participation fee of $20 to cover potential losses. On average, subjects earned $25 each, ranging from $11 to $36, and this was paid in cash. Each experimental session lasted about 80 minutes.
Hypotheses
Our experiment tests five hypotheses motivated by the theoretical predictions. The first hypothesis addresses the comparative static properties of equilibrium in terms of a change in the attacker's valuation. 15 The next two describe equilibrium predictions concerning behavior in the Lottery-Low and Lottery-High treatments. The final two hypotheses describe equilibrium predictions concerning behavior in the Auction-Low and Auction-High treatments.
Hypothesis 1:
Under the lottery and auction CSF, as the attacker's valuation increases from 40 to 80, the average resource allocation, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender).
Hypothesis 2:
In the Lottery-Low and Lottery-High treatments the attacker uses a "complete-coverage" strategy, which involves allocating a strictly positive and identical level of the resource across all targets.
Hypothesis 3:
In the Lottery-Low treatment the defender uses a "complete-coverage" strategy. In the Lottery-High treatment the defender allocates a strictly positive and identical level of the resource across all targets with positive probability, and a zero level of the resource with the remaining probability.
Hypothesis 4:
In the Auction-Low and Auction-High treatments the attacker uses a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy, which involves allocating a random level of the resource to at most one target.
Hypothesis 5:
In the Auction-Low treatment the defender uses a stochastic "completecoverage" strategy, which involves allocating positive random levels of the resource to all of the targets. In the Auction-High treatment the defender follows a stochastic "complete-coverage" strategy with positive probability and also allocates a zero level of the resource to every target with positive probability. Also, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the attacker's probability of winning in the LotteryHigh treatment (0.68) is higher than his probability of winning in the Lottery-Low treatment (0.51), and the probability of winning in Auction-High (0.68) is higher than the probability of winning in Auction-Low (0.33). The middle panel of Table 4 reports the regression results from a random effects probit model. From that estimation, we see that, for both the auction and lottery CSFs, the attacker's (defender's) probability of winning is higher (lower) in the high attacker valuation treatment (p-values < 0.01).
Results
Aggregate Behavior
Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 1, from the estimation reported in the bottom panel of Result 1: Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1, under the lottery and auction CSF, as the attacker's valuation increases, the average allocation of tokens, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender).
Although the comparative static predictions of the theory are supported by our experiment, there is significant over-expenditure of resources by both player types in all treatments. In the Lottery-Low treatment, the attacker allocates on average 4.4 tokens, instead of the predicted 3.2, and in the Lottery-High treatment, the attacker allocates 7.8 tokens, instead of 5.3. The relative magnitude of over-expenditure by the defender is similar: 19.4 tokens instead of 16.1 and 19.3 tokens instead of 13.1. The range of average over-expenditure is 21%-47%. Overexpenditure is also observed in the Auction-High and Auction-Low treatments; however, the magnitude is around 10%-22%. 16 As a result of significant over-expenditure, in all treatments both player types receive lower payoffs than predicted (see Table 3 ).
Significant over-expenditure in our experiment is consistent with previous experimental findings on all-pay auctions and lottery contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011; .
Suggested explanations for over-expenditure include bounded rationality (Sheremeta, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2014) , utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Cason et al., 2012 Cason et al., , 2017 , otherregarding preferences (Fonseca, 2009; , judgmental biases (Shupp et al., 2013) , and impulsive behavior (Sheremeta, 2016) . 17 The same arguments can be made to explain over-expenditure in our experiment.
Behavior of Attackers under the Lottery CSF
Next, we examine attacker behavior under the lottery CSF, where, in equilibrium, the attacker employs a uniform allocation of tokens across targets. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, within 16 A standard Wald test, conducted on estimates of panel regression models, rejects the hypothesis that the average expenditures under the lottery CSF are equal to the predicted theoretical values in Table 3 (all p-values < 0.05).
Under the auction CSF we can reject the null hypothesis only for the defender (p-value < 0.05). 17 For a detailed review of possible explanations for the over-expenditure phenomenon see Sheremeta (2013 Sheremeta ( , 2016 .
each target the allocation of tokens is highly dispersed. Another inconsistency with Hypothesis 2 is that, instead of a strictly positive token allocation for each target, the attacker places mass at 0 (see Figure 1) . Table 5 shows properties of the strategies used by subjects in the Lottery-Low and Lottery-High treatments. The attacker frequently uses a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy that attacks at most one target (44% in the LotteryLow treatment and 46% in the Lottery-High treatment). A strategy of "complete coverage,"
allocating a positive amount to all four targets, is used only 24% of time in the Lottery-Low treatment and 32% in the Lottery-High treatment.
Result 2: Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 2, in the Lottery-Low and Lottery-High treatments, the attacker's allocation of tokens to each target is highly dispersed. Instead of using the "complete-coverage" strategy, the attacker uses the "guerrilla-warfare" strategy that allocates a positive bid to one or fewer targets in more than 50% of the periods.
The fact that the attacker's resource allocation to each target is highly dispersed is consistent with previous experimental studies documenting high variance of individual expenditures in lottery contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Chowdhury et al., 2014) . Several explanations have been offered for this behavior based on the probabilistic nature of lottery contests and bounded rationality (Chowdhury et al., 2013) . These could also explain the pattern observed in our experiment.
A more novel finding of our study is the use of a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy by the attacker. This is inconsistent with the unique Nash equilibrium in the attack and defense game under the lottery CSF. Also, it appears unlikely that attackers adjust their strategy away from equilibrium due to suboptimal behavior on the part of defenders because, as we discuss later, defenders behave in accordance with the theoretical predictions.
A likely explanation why attackers use a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy is that subjects may find it natural to concentrate resources on the necessary number of targets needed for victory (one in our case). Although such a strategy is not optimal, it is an appealing focal point (Schelling, 1960) . It has been well documented in the experimental literature that subjects naturally gravitate towards focal points even when it is not necessarily in their best interest (Roth, 1985; Crawford et al., 2008 , Chowdhury et al. 2016 . Such a heuristic strategy can also explain why individual behavior is so close to the theoretical predictions under the auction CSF (as we discuss below).
Behavior of Defenders under the Lottery CSF
Our results concerning the behavior of the defender support Hypothesis 3. In particular, theory predicts that in the Lottery-Low treatment the defender makes a strictly positive, and uniform, allocation of tokens across targets. Table 5 , indicates that, supporting Hypothesis 3, the defender allocates tokens to all targets in the Lottery-Low treatment 92% of the time. In the Lottery-High treatment, theory predicts that the defender covers all of the targets with probability 0.83 and none of the targets with probability 0.17. Consistent with this prediction, the data indicate that the defender covers all of the targets in the Lottery-High treatment 84% of the time and none of the targets 12% of the time. However, contrary to Hypothesis 3, instead of a uniform allocation across targets, the defender's resources are distributed between 0 and 50 (see Figure   1 ).
Result 3:
Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 3, in the Lottery-Low treatment, the defender uses a "complete-coverage" strategy by defending all targets and in the LotteryHigh treatment there is a very high incidence of "complete coverage," but with the "no coverage" strategy (allocating zero to every target) the next most frequent strategy. Contrary to the prediction, instead of a uniform allocation across targets, allocations are dispersed over the interval [0, 50] .
As in the case of attackers, the relatively high dispersion of the allocations of defenders is consistent with previous experimental findings, and could be explained by the probabilistic nature of lottery contests and bounded rationality (Chowdhury et al., 2013) .
Behavior of Attackers under the Auction CSF
Next, we look at attacker behavior under the auction CSF. Theory predicts that in the Auction-Low and Auction-High treatments, the attacker employs a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy, which involves allocating a random level of the resource to at most one target. Figure 2 displays the empirical univariate marginal cumulative distribution function of the resource allocation to a target and indicates that, in the aggregate, the attacker's behavior is consistent with this prediction. The stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy is characterized by a significant mass point at 0 for the attacker, which is very close to the predicted value (0.75 versus 0.80 in the Auction-Low treatment and 0.67 versus 0.75 in the Auction-High treatment). 19 Similarly, from Table 6 , we see that the attacker allocates tokens to at most one target 89% of the time in the Auction-Low treatment and 81% of the time in the Auction-High treatment. These findings provide substantial support for Hypothesis 4.
Result 4: Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 4, in the Auction-Low and AuctionHigh treatments, the attacker uses a stochastic "guerrilla-warfare" strategy, which involves allocating a random level of the resource to at most one target.
Behavior of Defenders under the Auction CSF
We find that defender behavior is also consistent with Hypothesis 5. In particular, theory predicts that in the Auction-Low treatment the defender uses a stochastic "complete-coverage" strategy that allocates a strictly positive level of resources to each target with probability one.
The data indicate that the defender covers all of the targets 87% of the time (see Table 6 ).
Moreover, consistent with the theoretical prediction, in the Auction-Low treatment the defender's resources are uniformly distributed between 0 and 40 (see Figure 2) . Similarly, in the AuctionHigh treatment defender behavior is consistent with the theoretical prediction that with probability 0.375 the defender engages in no defensive efforts and with probability 0.625 the defender allocates a stochastic number of tokens, uniformly distributed between 0 and 50, to each target. The data indicate that the defender covers all four targets 62% of the time, three targets 2%, two targets 2%, one target 4%, and zero targets 30% of the time (see Table 6 ).
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Moreover, the defender's allocations are uniformly distributed between 0 and 50 (see Figure 2 ).
theoretical predictions (in the Auction-Low and Auction-High treatments, for example, the mass points at 0 for the attackers are 0.6 and 0.5). 20 The fact that the defender allocates 0 resources to all four targets 30% of the time could, potentially, be due to subjects changing role assignments after 10 periods and a period 1-10 attacker continuing to behave as an attacker during periods 11-20. However, our results are robust to restricting data to the first 10 periods.
Result 5: Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 5, in the Auction-Low treatment, the defender uses a stochastic "complete-coverage" strategy that involves allocating random positive levels of the resource to all of the targets. In the Auction-High treatment there is a high incidence of "complete-coverage," but the "no-coverage" strategy is employed almost a third of the time.
Conclusions
This study experimentally investigates behavior in a game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network under two benchmark contest success functions: the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. We find that the auction CSF's theoretical prediction that the attacker uses a "guerrilla-warfare" strategy and the defender uses a "complete-coverage" strategy is observed under both the auction and lottery CSFs. This is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium behavior under the lottery CSF. However, such behavior is consistent with a simple heuristic strategy of focusing only on the necessary number of targets needed for victory (one in our case).
A common explanation for the empirical finding that "periods of high terrorism" seem to be relatively infrequent (Enders, 2007) is that terrorists face a resource constraint, and therefore they cannot constantly attack all of the targets. Our experiment provides evidence for an alternative explanation. Infrequent "periods of high terrorism" may simply be the result of asymmetric objectives and strategic interactions between the attackers and defenders within a weakest-link contest environment. 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by the subject over the course of the experiment. The standard errors are clustered at the session level to account for session effects. In this appendix, we complete the characterization of equilibrium in the two-player simultaneous-move game of attack and defense with a set of contests with the lottery CSF in which the players have the objectives defined in equations (2) for all ∈ {1, … , } and some ∈ ℝ = . Furthermore, ( ) = ( ) for all ∈ {1, … , }. That is the mixed strategy j5K (⋅ | ] ) corresponds to a situation in which player chooses ∈ ℝ = 21 Note that j5K is the Fréchet-Hoeffding upper bound -copula, and the properties of j5K are well known. See
Nelsen (2006) and Schweizer and Sklar (1983) for further details.
according to ] and sets ] 5 = for all ∈ {1, … , }. Note that under this notation, player 's pure strategy of allocating ] 5 = ∈ ℝ = for all ∈ {1, … , } may be written as
where the distribution function ] is degenerate, placing all mass on . We now provide an outline of the proof, which consists of three parts. In part one, we
show that all equilibria are interchangeable with the equilibrium stated in the corresponding case of Proposition 1. In part two, we state a slightly modified version of Lemma 1 of Clark and Konrad (2007) and, thereby, provide a condition ¾ which is satisfied in equilibrium under the parameter restrictions of both parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 ¾ under which the best response to a uniform strategy is necessarily a uniform strategy. If any equilibrium is interchangeable with a uniform equilibrium and the best response to a uniform strategy is necessarily a uniform strategy, then it follows that all equilibria must be uniform equilibria. That is, parts one and two imply that every equilibrium is a uniform equilibrium. We conclude the proof by showing that the combination of part one and all equilibria are uniform can be used to establish uniqueness of equilibrium.
Beginning with the proof of part one (i.e., all equilibria are interchangeable with the equilibrium stated in the corresponding case of Proposition 1), let
denote the uniform equilibrium stated in Proposition 1. 22 By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a second (possibly non-uniform) mixed-strategy equilibrium ( " , ' ) that is distinct from ( j5K (⋅ | " * ), j5K (⋅ | ' * )). Let " 5 be an indicator function that takes a value of one in the event that player wins the contest at target . Because, by assumption, these are both equilibria we know that neither player has a payoff increasing deviation. Thus, for player it must be the case that: 
Similarly, for player it must be that:
22 Recall that ' * is degenerate in case (i), where ' < ( − 1) " , with 
Taking the sum of (A2)-(A5), we have 2 − Part two involves a slightly modified statement of Lemma 1 of Clark and Konrad (2007) .
Lemma 1 (Clark and Konrad, 2007) : If player -plays a uniform strategy j5K (⋅ | V] ) such that V] 0 ≠ 1 (i.e. player -'s uniform strategy is not degenerate with all mass at 0), then each of player 's pure-strategy best responses to j5K (⋅ | V] ) is a uniform strategy.
Given that player -plays a uniform strategy j5K (⋅ | V] ) satisfying the Lemma 1 condition on V] , this slightly modified statement of Clark and Konrad's Lemma 1 follows directly from the proof of Lemma 1 in Clark and Konrad (2007) . Note that Lemma 1 implies that in any mixed strategy best-response to a uniform strategy j5K (⋅ | V] ), satisfying the Lemma 1 condition on V] , player places probability one on a subset of the set of uniform pure-strategy best responses
to V] . To summarize, the best response to a uniform strategy is necessarily a uniform strategy.
For both cases of Proposition 1, (i) ' ≥ ( − 1) " and (ii) ' < ( − 1) " , the proof that every equilibrium is a uniform equilibrium follows directly from the combination of steps one and two. If any equilibrium is interchangeable with the uniform equilibrium stated in Proposition 1 and the best response to a uniform strategy is necessarily a uniform strategy, then all equilibria are uniform equilibria. This completes the proof of part two.
We conclude the proof by showing that the combination of part one and all equilibria are uniform can be used to establish uniqueness of equilibrium. The following proof is for the case that ' ≥ ( − 1) " . The remaining case that ' < ( − 1) " follows along similar lines. By way of contradiction suppose that for ' ≥ ( − 1) " there exists a uniform equilibrium 
Note that equation (A7) coincides with equation (14) of Clark and Konrad (2007) , which as they show in the proof of their Proposition 1 (provided in the Appendix of that paper) has a unique solution ' = ' * = P < P 9 RST P < =P 9 RST (A8)
Similarly, for player and each " in the support of j5K (⋅ | " ), the corresponding first-order condition is given by 
which coincides with equation (10) of Clark and Konrad (2007) and as they show, equation (A9) has a unique solution
Hence, we have a contradiction to the assumption that ( j5K (⋅ | " ), j5K (⋅ | ' )) is distinct from ( j5K (⋅ | " * ), j5K (⋅ | ' * )) . Thus, for ' ≥ ( − 1) " the equilibrium stated in case (i) of Proposition 1 is the unique equilibrium, and this completes the characterization of equilibrium.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
The second part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or as participant 2. You will stay in the same role assignment for the first 10 periods and then change your role assignment for the last 10 periods of the experiment. Each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant of opposite assignment to form a two-person group. So, if you are participant 1, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 2. If you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 1.
Each period, both participants will choose how many tokens to allocate to 4 boxes in order to receive a reward. Each token costs 1 franc. The reward is worth 200 francs to participant 1 and 40 francs to participant 2. An example of a decision screen is shown below.
Participant 1 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 200 (including 0.1 decimal points) to each box. The total number of tokens in all boxes cannot exceed 200. Similarly, participant 2 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 40 (including 0.1 decimal points). The total number of tokens in all boxes cannot exceed 40.
The more tokens you allocate to a particular box, the more likely you are to win that box. The more tokens the other participant allocates to the same box, the less likely you are to win that box. Specifically, for each token you allocate to a particular box you will receive 10 lottery tickets. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other participant in your group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins. Thus, your chance of winning a particular box is given by the number of tokens you allocate to that box divided by the total number of tokens you and the other participant allocate to that box. Chance of winning a box = Number of tokens you allocate to that box Number of tokens you allocate + Number of tokens the other participant allocates to that box In case both participants allocate zero to the same box, the computer will randomly chose a winner of that box. Therefore, each participant has the same chance of winning the box.
Example of the Random Draw
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw. Let's say participant 1 and participant 2 allocate their tokens to the 4 boxes in the following way. Participant 1 allocates 20.2 tokens to box 1, 18.5 tokens to box 2, 25 tokens box 3, and 40 tokens to box 4 (a total of 103.7 tokens). Participant 2 allocates 15 tokens to box 1, 15 tokens to box 2, 0 tokens to box 3, and 5 tokens to box 4 (a total of 35 tokens). Therefore, the computer will assign lottery tickets to participant 1 and to participant 2 according to their allocation of tokens.
For example, in box 1, the computer will assign 202 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 150 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer will randomly draw one lottery ticket out of 352 (202+150). As you can see, participant 1 has a higher chance of winning box 1: 20.2/(20.2+15) = 0.57. Participant 2 has lower chance of winning box 1: 15/(20.2+15) = 0.43.
Similarly, in box 3, the computer will assign 250 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 0 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer will randomly draw one lottery ticket out of 250 (250+0). As you can see, participant 2 has no chance of winning box 3: 0/(25+0) = 0.0. Therefore, participant 1 will win box 3 for sure: 25/(25+0) = 1.0.
YOUR EARNINGS
After both participants allocate their tokens and press the OK button, the computer will make a random draw for each box separately and independently. The random draws made by the computer will decide which boxes you win. Then the computer will assign a reward either to participant 1 or participant 2. The computer will assign a reward to participant 1 only if participant 1 wins all 4 boxes. Otherwise, the computer will assign the reward to participant 2. The reward is worth 200 francs to participant 1 and 40 francs to participant 2. Regardless of who receives the reward, both participants will have to pay for the tokens they allocated to the 4 boxes (each token costs 1 franc). Thus, the period earnings will be calculated in the following way:
If 520 francs) . Depending on the outcome in a given period, you may receive either positive or negative earnings. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 1 out of the first 10 periods and 1 out of the last 10 periods of the experiment for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these two periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. If the earnings are negative, we will subtract them from your participation fee. If the earnings are positive, we will add them to your participation fee.
At the end of each period, the allocation of your tokens, the allocation of the other participant's tokens, which boxes you win, whether you received the reward or not, and your period earnings are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading.
IMPORTANT NOTES
At the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or as participant 2. You will stay in the same role assignment for the first 10 periods and then change your role assignment for the last 10 periods of the experiment. Each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant of opposite assignment to form a two-person group. So, if you are participant 1, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 2. If you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 1.
Both participants will choose how many tokens to allocate to 4 boxes. After both participants allocate their tokens, the computer will make a random draw for each box separately and independently. You can never guarantee that you will win a particular box. However, by increasing your allocation to that box, you can increase your chance of winning that box. The computer will assign a reward to participant 1 only if participant 1 wins all 4 boxes. Otherwise, the computer will assign the reward to participant 2. Regardless of who receives the reward, both participants will have to pay for the tokens they allocated to 4 boxes. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 1 out of the first 10 periods and 1 out of the last 10 periods of the experiment for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these two periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 3
The third part of the experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. The rules for Part 3 are exactly the same as the rules for Part 2. As in Part 2, at the beginning of the first period, you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or as participant 2. You will stay in the same role assignment for the first 10 periods and then change your role assignment for the last 10 periods of the experiment. Each period you will be randomly repaired with another participant of opposite assignment to form a two-person group. So, if you are participant 1, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 2. If you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 1.
Each period, both participants will choose how many tokens to allocate to 4 boxes in order to receive a reward. Each token costs 1 franc. The only difference from Part 2 is that in Part 3 the reward is worth 200 francs to participant 1 and 80 francs (instead of 40 francs) to participant 2. Participant 1 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 200 (including 0.1 decimal points) to each box. The total number of tokens in all boxes cannot exceed 200. Similarly, participant 2 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 80 (including 0.1 decimal points). The total number of tokens in all boxes cannot exceed 80.
After both participants allocate their tokens and press the OK button, the computer will make a random draw for each box separately and independently. The random draws made by the computer will decide which boxes you win. Then the computer will assign a reward either to participant 1 or participant 2. The computer will assign a reward to participant 1 only if participant 1 wins all 4 boxes. Otherwise, the computer will assign the reward to participant 2. The reward is worth 200 francs to participant 1 and 80 francs to participant 2. Regardless of who receives the reward, both participants will have to pay for the tokens they allocated to the 4 boxes (each token costs 1 franc).
At the end of each period, the allocation of your tokens, the allocation of the other participant's tokens, which boxes you win, whether you received the reward or not, and your period earnings are reported on the outcome screen. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. At the end of the experiment we will randomly select 1 out of the first 10 periods and 1 out of the last 10 periods of the experiment for actual payment. You will sum the total earnings for these two periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.
